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Abstract— This paper describes a hierarchical design for
knowledge representation in computational autobiographic
memory. This model is named AMIA (Autobiographic Memory
for Intelligent Agents). Inspired by research in human autobi-
ographic memory from the areas of Psychology and Cognitive
Science, the self memory system (SMS) is modelled as 1) the
general knowledge structure of agents’ significant events and 2)
the unique “self” that SMS creates for an individual agent.
We first carry out a concentrated review of autobiographic
memory, emotion and event, and how they relate to each other.
For AMIA, we start with an overview for different levels of
the overall organisation and interactions between levels. We
then focus on the design at the bottom level of AMIA – Action
and Event levels. We also discuss the role of general event
representations (GERs) which create knowledge representations
for routine and highly expected events to be understood by
autonomous agents, in conjunction with support from the
autobiographic knowledge base in the reconstruction process
of autobiographic events. Finally, we discuss the possible agent
implementations for future research directions.
Index Terms— Knowledge representation, computational au-
tobiographic memory, autobiograhpic agents, general event
representations.
I. INTRODUCTION
When creating a cognitive model with the capabilities of
learning and development for autonomous agents, memory
and representation are essentially incorporated. Systems in
earlier classical AI tend to represent knowledge in a machine-
understandable and symbolically-grounded way often for
computers to understand human natural language and to
perform efficient searches for problem-solving. Script, from
Schank and Abelson [1], captures two important aspects
of human memory in the perspective of developmental
psychology: 1) it represents everyday events and activities,
and 2) it has social-cultural components. However, early
models like Frame [2] and Script represent knowledge in
abstract static structures with little or no relation to “organic”
developmental processes, or emotion.
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In recent years embodied AI emphasizes the on-going
interaction between agents and their environments, in which
the representation of the same object, depending on the
behavioural or conceptual account for this object to an indi-
vidual agent, can be very different and can lead to different
meanings existing in agents’ memory. Therefore, knowledge
representation models for embodied autonomous agents, we
believe, have to be ethologically-based [3]. Researchers in
embodied AI have also suggested that these differences of
meanings in knowledge representation among agents can be
negotiated via social interaction [4] and social learning [5].
To create a comprehensive model for autonomous agents
to represent knowledge of dynamic events devrived from
the interaction with their environment and other agents’
narrative storytelling; our approach is inspired by research
from Psychology and Cognitive Science into autobiographic
memory and human memory in general. Our model, AMIA
(Autobiographic Memory for Intelligent Agents), does not
aim to simulate all characteristics of adult autobiographic
memory, but it captures essential features from a number
of well developed psychological models. AMIA establishes
the inter-relationship between the autobiographic knowledge
base, which generates the working “self” based on the given
goal activity, and general event representations (GERs) for
handling routine and highly anticipated events for agents.
External events, which can be experienced by agents, have
been broken down into action units for the purpose of 1)
comparing temporal action sequences with existing event
categories in GERs and 2) attributing emotion to significant
events which violate expectations generated by GERs.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we carry out a concentrated review of
interdisciplinary research on autobiographic memory from
Psychology, Cognitive Science and Computer Science. We
start by investigating the main cognitive and psychologi-
cal model of the self memory system (SMS) proposed by
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce [6]. We then investigate the
subtle relationships between emotion and memory in order
to identify the attribution of emotion to meaningful actions
forming important events to be remembered by agents.
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A. Human Autobiographic Memory
Autobiographic memory is a specific kind of episodic
memory [7] and contains significant and meaningful personal
experiences of a human being. Two features of autobi-
ographic memory are generally defined and accepted by
researchers in psychology, as pointed out by [8]:
• Autobiographic memories are mental constructions of
the self.
• They very often feature imagery while simultaneously
containing abstract personal knowledge.
From the perspective of considering humans as social beings,
developmental psychologist Nelson [7] carried out her inves-
tigations on how children develop their own autobiographic
memory, and she suggested that the primary function of
autobiographic memory is to allow the sharing of one’s own
memories with other people. Other studies in psychology and
cognitive development have also pointed out the cognitive,
as well as social, function of autobiographic memory as
underlying all of human story telling and history-making
narrative activity.
1) Self Memory System (SMS): Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce [6], introduced the self memory system (SMS) as a
model of the relationship of autobiographic memory to the
self. They suggested that the self is a set of memory structures
which represent specific self-knowledge – knowledge which
reflects to a specific self. There are three main components
for SMS: 1) episodic memory system, 2) long-term self and
3) working self, as indicated by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce
[4]. These components are mutually influening each other.
The episodic memory system may provide input to the work-
ing self to fulfil its function of keeping track of plan execution
in the course of ongoing goal processing. The working self,
depending on goal activity status, mediates between episodic
memory and the long-term self by generating a dynamic
model of goal relevant knowledge and experience. The long-
term self contains the knowledge required by the working
self to organise and instantiate active goal processes.
2) Autobiographic Memory and Emotion: Memories with
emotions can be seen as experiences of love, anger, happi-
ness, and depression, etc. Psychological and Cognitive Sci-
ence research have indicated that emotion plays an important
role in both autobiographic memory encoding and retrieval
processes. Conway [9] indicates that during the encoding
process, emotion affects the vividness of events remembered
in autobiographic memory: when experiencing an event with
emotion, the cognitive system is more fully engaged in pro-
cessing that event, in comparison to the processing of events
which are not associated with strong emotional experience.
In the autobiographic memory retrieval process, a high
level of emotional intensity is an important factor in the
creation of a highly available (easy to recall) memory [9].
The reason is that, similarly to the memory encoding process,
intense emotions lead to an increase in attention and more
extensive processing of the associated event.
B. Events
In Developmental Psychology, it is widely acknowledged
that the world is experienced by humans as a series of
ongoing events. In general, events incorporate objects and
relations in a larger whole, covering the basic knowledge
representation structure as in traditional Cognitive Science
research. Special aspects of events in knowledge representa-
tion are as follows [10]:
• They have a holistic structure which has strong charac-
teristics for structural organisation in memory.
• They may change internally over time.
• Meanings are offered to individuals through everyday
experiences.
• Stable mental elements, such as concepts and categories,
are derived from initial contents (events) of mental
representations.
Events are also very important in autobiographic memory
because they provide a link from more abstract, thematic,
goal-based autobiographic knowledge to representations of
specific experience in episodes and event-specific knowl-
edge [11]. Nevertheless, there are difficulties when utilising
event structures to represent knowledge in agents’ memory
since they don’t possess a cognitive structure to “under-
stand” events naturally, as a human would. Modelling event
structures in autobiographic memory involves three basic
procedures including 1) breaking down an event into different
units, 2) defining the meaning and importance that each unit
contributes to the whole event, and 3) drawing a clear lines
to mark the beginning and end of an event in memory.
The first two procedures have been experimentally mod-
elled in agent research, such as Ho, et al [12] and Ho, et
al [13]. For the third procedure, Conway, et al [11] indicated
that the boundary of a current event in autobiographic mem-
ory is defined through the process of goal transitions – an
event is ended when a goal is accomplished.
III. AMIA (AUTOBIOGRAPHIC MEMORY FOR
INTELLIGENT AGENTS
In this section, for the purpose of modelling a simplified
version of human SMS, we illustrate in detail the framework
for knowledge representation in AMIA. To clearly identify
features offered by components at the bottom level of the
framework, after the introduction to the overall organisation,
we divide the rest of this section into smaller subsections
based on the structure and the role of each of these compo-
nents.
A. Overall Organisation
With modelling certain features which reflect on the gen-
eral characteristics of human autobiographic memory and
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Fig. 1. An overview of knowledge representation in AMIA (details of some
components are depicted in separate subsections with enlarged figures).
GER, AMIA covers different aspects of information process-
ing for believable and intelligent agents. Figure 1 shows an
overview for the whole knowledge representation framework
of AMIA.
AMIA consists of five main components: Action Level,
Event Level, Episode Level, Theme Level and Life Period
Level. They are organised in a bottom up fashion – high
level components are constructed by contents from within
the component located at the next level beneath them. The
duration of these separate components differs according to
the level of granularity involved in their definition.
B. Action Level
As we argued in the Background section an event, which
has some particular characteristics such as its holistic struc-
ture and internal dynamics, is very suitable to be used
for modelling knowledge representation in autobiographic
memory. Here we define an event, in AMIA, as a collection of
any number of actions which can be grouped together based
on their inclusion in a specific psychologically meaningful
pattern. Furthermore, a general event experienced by an agent
should have basic components that include:
• Scene settings - time, location, agents that involved into
the event, etc.
• Situation-action pattern - a sequence of actions that
agent performed individually over time under specific
situations.
Figure 2 illustrates basic components of an event and
how an event can be absorbed by a GER. For events which
are novel or significant, an agent’s current emotion may be
attributed to related actions when constructing these events in
the Episodic Level of AMIA. At the same time, evaluations
Fig. 2. Basic event components and the relationship between Action Level
and Event Level.
Fig. 3. GERs in Event Level and how they interact with other components
in AMIA.
may also be built up and attached to the event structure. This
feature will be discussed in the last subsection.
C. Event Level
Each event experienced by an agent will be examined
through a “filtering” process in the Event Level. A new event
category is created when an event cannot be absorbed into
existing GERs – the event is different from existing GERs
– a novel event. Forming the existing GERs is a critical and
dynamic process in maintaining the coherent behaviours of
agents and it requires retrieving a considerable amount of
knowledge from autobiographic memory based on the current
ongoing goal activity. Novel and significant events, which
may create a considerable amount of discrepancy between
the standard and current state of the world, will provide
event specific knowledge (ESK, see next sub-section Episode
Level for details) and take part in forming particular episodes
in the Episode Level. For example, in previous work [12]
significant events were indicated by a substantial amount of
changes in agents’ internal physiological variables. Moreover,
GERs also provide categories of routine events to support
the constructions of important episodes. These features are
illustrated in Figure 3.
1) GERs: In AMIA, GERs are event categories organ-
ised dynamically based on the current goal activity. Their
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goal-oriented event categories can be perceived as memory
schemata and scripts since they generally encapsulate all of
an agent’s knowledge of a particular type of object, situation
or event. Knowledge for digesting routine events - events
that are familiar and do not create emotional impact to the
agent - is similar to human semantic knowledge which is used
to understand the world. Therefore these event categories
provide expectations about what the agent will experience
(e.g. see, hear).
When an event from the Action Level is evaluated against
GERs, if it does not differ from the existing categories,
it will be “absorbed” into the GERs through rehearsing
the categories and its content details can decay overtime.
Therefore routine events do not have great details in GERs
but their schematic structure and meaning are preserved.
If the event is novel or some part of it violates the
expectations provided by GERs, it will be encoded as a new
category and also, if it contains procedural information such
as if it exists as part of a sequence of events for a common
goal, this event will also be encoded into episodes in the
higher Episode Level.
2) Goal Structure and Working Self: Agents’ specific
autobiographic memories are constructed from event specific
knowledge (ESK) which forms memories in Episode, Theme
and Life Period Levels [6]. This construction takes place in
the conjunction of the working “self” with the autobiographic
knowledge base (as illustrated in Figure 3) and occurs when
the complex goal system of the working self modulates
knowledge access and memory construction. Therefore the
working “self” for agents can be seen as a subset of working
memory control processes closely connected with the current
goal structure and it always monitors the goal accomplish-
ment.
The goal structure modulated by the working “self” is
designed to form an iterative loop whose purpose is to
reduce the discrepancy between desired and actual goal
states. In performing this discrepancy reduction, behaviour
is regulated. Goals (and their respective sub-goals) emerge
from autobiographic knowledge and guide selective attention
and the behavioural processes necessary to perpetuate the
current goal structure.
In order to ensure this structure is maintained, the working
“self” supported by the autobiographic knowledge base also
continuously monitors events and verifies the current goal
attainment. In this way, the goal structure directs behaviour
in a manner which compliments the agent’s previous under-
standing of the situation. In turn, this verification process
will lead to the encoding and further consolidation of GERs
– presumably in order to reduce the quantity of information
that actually has to be stored and to facilitate a more cohesive
“self”.
In summary, the autobiographic knowledge-base and the
working “self” for agents are instrumental in the genera-
tion and maintenance of a goal structure, thus providing a
cohesive narrative for the agent to follow. After presenting
the general framework of the relationship of goal activity to
memory in the working self, we now turn to event specific
knowledge (ESK) in the Episode Level.
D. Episode Level
When an event, or at least part of it, violates an agent’s
goal-related expectations and cannot be “absorbed” by the
existing GERs, some temporal information and details of
specific actions which create emotional impacts from this
event will remain as event specific knowledge (ESK) in the
Episode Level. Thus, episodes are represented in the autobio-
graphic knowledge base largely by event-specific knowledge,
and an event is a representation that binds together a set of
significant-action-based ESK.
In order to ensure that each episode in autobiographic
memory is meaningful and coherent, GERs from the Event
Level generate routine events and semantic knowledge (e.g.
information for the sequence of some typical events in a
specific episode) to support the formation of a complete
episode. Note that this process is also influenced by the
autobiographic knowledge base which constructs the working
“self” for the agent based on the goal activity.
Figure 4 shows a general picture of contents in the Episode
Level, interactions between the Episode Level and other
components in the framework, and details of a significant
event as an example.
Events retained in the Episode Level and forming specific
episodes are different in duration and complexity and they
are highly specific unique experiences. Unlike routine events
in GERs, they also act as organising representations for
memories of more specific occurrences. Therefore knowledge
constructing these specific events constitutes a central feature
in autobiographic memory.
E. Theme and Life Period Levels
On top of the Episode Level, in AMIA we propose
Theme and Life Period Levels as more abstract levels of
autobiographical knowledge that can further characterise an
individual agent’s life.
Theme structures would be constructed using components
from multiple episodes which typically consist of several
events and fewer themes than episodes will exist for agents
because of the structural nature of both in time. Thus signifi-
cant events and episodes are representations that provide the
“data” that ground themes and goals in actual or recorded
experience. The Life Period Level contains life periods and
each of them is constructed by themes in temporal sequences
based on the goal-oriented working “self” the agent had in a
relatively longer period of time.
The autobiographic knowledge base consists of the levels
of Episode, Theme and Lifetime Period that structure the
episodic memory system to generate specific autobiographic
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Fig. 4. Event specific knowledge (ESK) in Episode Level and how it forms
episodes.
memories. For example, as the autobiographic agent changes
its environment, role in the system, or relationship with users
or other agents; its current psychological representation of
past experiences gradually transforms into self-knowledge
in the Theme and Lifetime Period Level. The period of
transition may reflect the re-organization of the working
“self” which is in charge of goal structure in any given time.
F. Evaluation of Different Levels in the Framework
Each component of the knowledge representation structure
in AMIA (Life Period, Theme, Episode, Event, and Action)
can provide an evaluation attaching to its contents separately.
Evaluations for routine actions and events in Action and
Event Levels are encoded in the GER structure – because
these actions and events are highly predictable and there is
no violation of the agent’s expectations.
Evaluations for components with more abstracted contents
(Episode, Theme and Life Period Levels) will be created
during the first reflective process, and provide an overall
summary of the experiences that belong to the actions/events
that are included in the specific episode, for example, a
conversational autobiographic agent remembering the inter-
action with an individual user in a fixed period of time. This
example as a whole (from the user introducing himself/herself
to saying good-bye to the agent at the end) constitutes a
specific episode, which will be part of the theme “interacting
with user X”.
The particularly memorable events that occurred during the
interaction with user X (such as X saying some incomprehen-
sible words or telling the agent about his happy experiences)
are all encoded with an accompanying emotional impact and
evaluation. For example, in the system input interface, users
can have different text symbols (e.g. exclamation marks and
smiling-face icons) and colours (e.g. red and blue colours
represents angry and happy respectively) for expressing their
emotions attributed to memorable events which can be com-
prehended by the agent. Since, in this way, the agent can
remember each of these particular events from user X’s input,
it can reflect on the interaction as a whole in the Episode
Level and give an overall impression of how it feels about
user X.
However, this reflection can also be influenced by the
future experiences stored in the autobiographic knowledge
base; in that case evaluations and further re-evaluations
may change as the “self” of the agent develops. Extending
the same example, currently our conversational agent may
generate a general impression of user X as “a positive person”
following the interaction with him/her; later after the agent
had conversations with another fifty users, the impression of
user X may only be “a normal person with some happy ex-
periences”. This effect is the result of categorisation process
in GERs since user X’s individual happy experiences have
been repeated by other users’ experiences perceived by the
agent and they are no longer unique and significant.
IV. DISCUSSIONS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION FOR AGENTS
With autobiographic knowledge, agents can organise sig-
nificant experiences remembered throughout their “lifetime”
and develop their unique perspectives towards different ob-
jects or events things. With a simplified version of autobi-
ographic memory and semantic world knoweldge, we have
realised the concepts similar to the Action and Event levels
proposed in our previous work [13]: An educational anti-
bullying software populated with autonomous 3D characters.
With the simplified version of autobiographic memory, agents
as reported in [13] can 1) have more natural and appropriate
emotional reactions to events, and 2) tell a user of their
past experiences as a personal narrative. Therefore we expect
that a comprehensive model of autobiographic memory like
AMIA can further increase the believability of autonomous
and possibly conversational agents.
As researchers in computational event memory models
have claimed that autobiographic memory encounters testing
difficulties due to its effortful memory retrieval [14], AMIA
has transformed the structural hierarchy of the representation
of autobiographic knowledge into an implementable compu-
tational model which is suitable for believable and intelligent
agents.
Abstracted autobiographic knowledge in higher levels of
the framework – Theme and Life Period levels - may not be
applicable to agents solving quick problems, e.g. answering
users’ short questions in a limited period of time. However,
we believe it is important to have these two abstract levels of
knowledge for an agent to avoid exhaustive searches when it
tries to generate a general summary of past events. Instead
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of searching and comparing low-level action-situation pattern
details, agents can instantiate a theme using the existing
autobiographic knowledge in the Theme Level. Moreover, it
is also evident that humans abstract high-level knowledge and
rules from their experiences and can detect the emergence of
similar meanings in other experiences [14].
Narrative computational agents are usually pre-
programmed either with temporal and structured stories or
with simultaneously selecting story sequences from a large
story database when they are interacting with human users
in storytelling systems. Therefore, they can take advantage
of mechanisms used in natural historically grounded
systems [15] and enhance the friendliness of these systems.
While appreciating the success narrative agents bring to
storytelling systems or software interfaces, the investigation
of how agents themselves can benefit from autobiographic
narrative – using their existing experiences to interpret a
new story – is missing in the Narrative Intelligence research
field. A new story is defined here as an agent perceiving
a new event itself or receiving a story from another agent
through communication. An agent should then be able to
form a unique psychological interpretation of this story by
drawing upon their own existing autobiographic knowledge.
Another main research issue in character-based narrative
storytelling systems, i.e. role-play dramas or games, is how
to provide good “actors” - agents that react to different
situations in stories with appropriate emotional expression.
We argue that rather than setting a fixed group of parameters
which instruct agents how to “act” in a particular situation, it
is more realistic and flexible to shape agents’ “personality”
in a story and determine their emotion in a given situation by
allowing them to have their own autobiographic knowledge.
This approach thus 1) allows for the creation of agents
which can be “born with” certain types of personality for
role-play stories, e.g. via an authoring tool, each agent is
generated with certain cohesive autobiographic knowledge
to enhance its readiness for acting a specific role; and 2)
supports long-term development of virtual actors as they gain
more experience from acting in each new situation.
V. CONCLUSION
In AMIA, we define the autobiographic knowledge base
as significant events which contain novel and mostly unique
sensory experiences for agents. As a foundation of that,
we specify low-level basic units for event knowledge which
include basic scene setting and situation-action patterns in
temporal sequences. We also address the importance of
the dynamically reconstructed working “self” based on the
agent’s current goal activity for its influences on forming
general event representations to digest ongoing events.
We have adopted a hierarchical structure in AMIA which
illustrates that agents can benefit from autobiographic knowl-
edge in terms of learning from past experiences and long-term
development. On a behavioural level, we reviewed that, with
autobiographic memory, agents’ adaptivity can be enhanced.
Furthermore, we discussed that autobiographic knowledge
can ground higher level cognitive processes, e.g. goal formu-
lation, attention and emotion – resulting in increased agent
believability. Finally, we discussed possible future directions
for implementing AMIA in believable and intelligent agents.
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